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Proposed Revision to the Federal Reserve's 
Discount Window Lending Programs. 
Brian F Madigan and William R. Nelson, of the 
Board's Division of Monetary Affairs, prepared this 
article. The proposal discussed here incorporates 
contributions from many other Board and Reserve 
Bank staffmembers. 
The Board of Governors' Regulation A currently 
authorizes the Federal Reserve Banks to operate three 
main discount window programs: adjustment credit, 
extended credit, and seasonal credit. On May 17, 
2002, the Board published for public comment a 
proposed amendment to Regulation A that would 
establish two new discount window programs called 
primary credit and secondary credit as replacements 
for adjustment and extended credit. 
[note: 1]. The proposed amendment to Regulation A and request for 
comment can be found at www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/ 
bcreg/2002/20020517/default.htm. The Federal Register notice, 67 
Fed. Reg. 36,544, was published on May 24, 2002. [end of note.] 
The proposed 
amendment is intended to improve the functioning of 
the discount window and the money market more 
generally. The Board also requested comment on the 
continued need for the seasonal program but did not 
propose any substantive changes to the program. 
According to the proposal, primary credit would be 
available for very short terms, ordinarily overnight, 
to depository institutions that are in generally sound 
financial condition. The interest rate on primary credit 
would usually be above short-term market interest 
rates, including the federal funds rate, as opposed to 
the current situation in which the discount rate (the 
interest rate for adjustment credit) is typically below 
money market interest rates. 
Eliminating the existing incentive for depository 
institutions to borrow from the window to exploit the 
typically positive spread should substantially reduce 
the administration necessary for each discount win-
dow loan. In particular, borrowers of short-term pri-
mary credit would no longer be required to have 
exhausted other sources of funds before turning to 
the window nor be prohibited from borrowing to fund 
sales of federal funds. The reduction in administra-
tive burden should help encourage depository institu-
tions to turn to the discount window when money 
markets tighten significantly and should thereby 
improve the ability of the window to serve as a 
marginal source of reserves for the overall bank-
ing system and a backup source of liquidity for 
individual depository institutions. Secondary credit 
would be available, subject to Reserve Bank approval 
and monitoring, for depository institutions that did 
not qualify for primary credit. As required by law, all 
types of discount window loans would have to be 
backed by adequate collateral. 
The primary credit program would be broadly simi-
lar to mechanisms adopted by many other major 
central banks to provide credit at the margin at an 
above-market interest rate. Adoption of the proposal 
would not entail a change in the stance of monetary 
policy. It would not require a change in the Federal 
Open Market Committee's (FOMC) target for the 
federal funds rate and would not affect the level of 
market interest rates more generally. 
BACKGROUND. 
Functions of the Discount Window. 
In implementing monetary policy, the Federal 
Reserve employs open market operations as the prin-
cipal source of reserves to the banking system and 
currency to the public and as the principal means of 
effecting short-run adjustments in reserves. In this 
context, discount window credit has two main roles. 
First, it acts as a short-run safety valve for the overall 
banking system by making additional reserves avail-
able when the aggregate supply of reserves provided 
through open market operations falls short of 
demand, thereby preventing an excessive tightening 
of money market conditions. Second, it enables 
depository institutions that are financially sound but 
have experienced an unexpected shortage of reserves 
or funding to make payments while avoiding over-
drafts on their accounts at Federal Reserve Banks or 
shortfalls in meeting their reserve requirements. 
These discount window functions have been per-
formed primarily by the adjustment credit program. 
Adjustment credit is extended at the basic discount rate, which over the past decade has typically been 25 
to 50 basis points below the usual level of overnight 
market interest rates, as indexed by the federal funds 
rate (chart). 
[note: 2]. Over the Federal Reserve's first fifty years, the discount rate was 
generally equal to or higher than short-term market interest rates. The 
relationship changed in the mid-1960s, and the pattern established at 
that time has continued over most of the nearly four decades since 
then. The historical record indicates that the reversal at that time 
reflected macroeconomic policy considerations rather than a judgment 
that such a rate alignment was most suitable for operation of the 
discount window. [end of note.] 
Despite the below-market discount rate, 
the volume of adjustment credit has usually been 
relatively small, in part because the Federal Reserve 
has sought to prevent an uncontrolled expansion of 
the supply of reserves and a misallocation of credit 
by requiring that depository institutions borrow only 
to meet short-term needs and first exhaust other rea-
sonably available sources of funds. 
Chart: Effective federal funds rate and discount rate, 1955-2002 
[Graph plotting two lines: effective federal funds rate and discount rate. In 1955 they were both about 1.5%. Up to about 4% in  1957. In 1958 discount rate was about 2%, effective federal funds rate about 1%. In 1959 they were both about 4%. 1960 though  1963 discount stayed at about 3%, while effective federal funds went down to about 1% then back up to 3%. They go up to about  4.5% in 1966, but by 1970 they have separated so that discount rate is about 6%, effective federal funds rate about 9%. In 1972 they  are back down, discount to about 4.5%, effective federal funds to about 3.5%. In 1974, Discount is up to about 8%, effective federal  funds about 13%. 1977 they are down again, both at about 5%. In 1981 they are up, discount reaching a maximum of about 14%,  effective federal funds rate a maximum of about 19%. They go down again until 1986, Discount rate to about 5.5%, effective federal  funds rate to about 6%. 1989 discount rate is about 7%, effective federal funds rate about 10%. 1992 through 1993 they were both  down to about 3%. 1994 though 1999 they were up to about 5%. In 2000 discount rate was about 6%, effective federal funds rate  about 6.5%. In 2002 discount rate was about 1.5%, effective federal funds rate about 2%.] 
NOTE. The data are monthly and extend through May 2002. 
Under the proposed revision, the functions cur-
rently performed by adjustment credit would be per-
formed largely by primary credit. Primary credit 
would be the principal backup source of reserves 
for the system and of liquidity for individual deposi-
tory institutions that are in generally sound financial 
condition. Under the proposed arrangements, deposi-
tory institutions would have the incentive to seek 
out lower-priced alternatives on their own initia-
tive before requesting higher-priced primary credit. 
Because the interest rate on primary credit would be 
above the target federal funds rate and because the 
funds rate usually is close to its target, the aggregate 
volume of primary credit would be expected to be 
low. 
[note: 3]. The proposal for a primary credit program is unrelated to the 
Federal Reserve System's consideration of alternative assets as substi-
tutes for Treasury securities in its portfolio that was discussed in the 
FOMC minutes of January 30-31, 2001. The minutes of the meeting 
are available at www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/minutes/20010131.htm. 
Because the volume of primary credit outstanding ordinarily would be 
small, primary credit could not be a substitute for Treasuries as a 
major asset in the System portfolio. [end of note.] 
But the volume would be low because of a 
pricing differential not because administration by 
Federal Reserve Banks would limit the amount of 
borrowing. 
Besides serving as a marginal source of aggregate 
reserves to the market and a backup source of liquid-
ity to sound depository institutions, the discount win-
dow can also, at times, serve as a useful tool for 
promoting financial stability by providing temporary 
funding to depository institutions that are experienc-
ing significant financial difficulties. The provision of 
central bank credit can help guard against the sudden 
collapse of depository institutions by addressing 
liquidity strains while an institution is making a tran-
sition to sounder footing. Discount window credit 
can also be used to facilitate an orderly closure of 
a failing institution when consistent with least-cost 
resolution of the failure. An institution obtaining 
credit in such situations must be monitored appropri-
ately to ensure that it does not take excessive risks 
in an attempt to return to profitability or use central 
bank credit in a way that would increase costs to the 
deposit insurance fund of resolving the institution if a 
resolution ultimately became necessary. 
[note: 4]. Lending under such circumstances may be subject to the guide-
lines on lending to troubled institutions imposed by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991. [end of note.] 
Historically, 
the need for such loans to troubled banks has been 
met by extended credit; under the proposed revision, 
it would be met by secondary credit. [beginning of box:] Primary Credit: An Improved Safety Valve for Releasing Significant Market Pressures. 
A key function of adjustment credit is to serve as a safety 
valve for the bank reserves market. On any given day, the 
aggregate volume of reserves provided through open mar-
ket operations can fall short of the amount demanded as a 
result of fluctuations in various factors that affect the supply 
of or demand for reserves. Borrowing from the discount 
window creates additional reserves, so the willingness of 
depository institutions to turn to the discount window when 
such shortfalls occur governs the extent of the effects of the 
shortfalls on money market interest rates. If depository 
institutions are very reluctant to use the window, they bid 
vigorously for funds in the market, pushing money market 
rates, especially the overnight federal funds rate, up sharply. 
But if depository institutions are quite willing to use the 
window, the increase in the funds rate may be much more 
modest. 
Average borrowing on days on which the 
federal funds rate was high, 1989-2001 
[graph. In 1989 it was about $450 million. In 1990 it was about  $225 million. In 1991 about $175 million, in 1992 about $100  million, in 1993 about $50 million. In 1994 about $80 million, in  1995 about $200 million, in 1996 about $150 million, in 1997 about  300 million, in 1998 about $170 million, in 1999 about $175 million,  in 2000 about $230 million, in 2001 about $200 million.] 
NOTE. Average adjustment credit borrowing by large banks on days on 
which the federal funds rate was 25 to 200 basis points above the targeted 
federal funds rate at the close. The data are annual. 
The willingness of institutions to use the window and the 
associated effects of a shortfall in reserves on money market 
interest rates have varied considerably over time. One gauge 
of this willingness is the average level of adjustment credit 
extended to large banks on days when the funds rate tight-
ens moderately, exceeding the FOMC's target by 25 to 
200 basis points at the close (chart). 
During the early 1990s, that average was quite low. At its 
low point, reached in 1993, adjustment borrowing on mod-
erately tight days averaged just $45 million. In those years, 
a number of banking institutions experienced significant 
financial difficulties. As a result, many banks, even healthy 
institutions, were concerned that their borrowing would be 
viewed by other market participants as a sign of financial 
weakness. Such perceptions could result in serious difficul-
ties for the institution (or exacerbate existing problems). 
Even though the Federal Reserve holds information about 
borrowing by individual banks in the strictest confidence, 
market participants have at times tried to infer which banks 
might be borrowing through knowledge of which banks 
were bidding for funds in the market late in the day and 
from aggregate data published by the Federal Reserve. 
In recent years, institutions have become somewhat more 
willing to use the window, with adjustment borrowing on 
moderately tight days exceeding $200 million on average in 
2000 and 2001. The increased willingness has undoubtedly 
been largely due to the improved condition of the industry. 
Still, institutions have on occasion been willing to pay quite 
high rates in the market rather than turn to the discount 
window, suggesting that some institutions remain reluctant 
to borrow. Even if the proposed change in discount window 
structure does not completely eliminate that reluctance, it 
should still help damp late-day spikes in the federal funds 
rate. With no restrictions on the re-lending of funds obtained 
through the program, institutions that are willing to borrow 
at the window should have an incentive to borrow primary 
credit and lend in the funds market to other institutions that 
might have some residual reluctance to turn to the discount 
window. [end of box.] 
Shortcomings of Current Lending Programs 
Addressed by Proposal. 
The below-market interest rate on adjustment credit 
causes several significant problems. The incentive for 
depository institutions to exploit the below-market 
rate means that borrowing requests are subject to 
considerable administration. Such administration may 
involve a review of every prospective borrower's 
funding situation to establish at least a presumption 
that other reasonably available sources of funds have 
been exhausted, that the purpose of the borrowing is 
appropriate, and that the credit will not be used for 
arbitrage. Because such evaluations necessarily are 
subjective, achieving consistency in credit adminis-
tration across the System's twelve Reserve Banks is 
difficult. Also, the process of obtaining information 
on depository institutions' funding situations can be 
somewhat burdensome to the institutions, likely mak-
ing them reluctant to turn to the window. In addition, 
the rules for the use of discount window credit neces-
sitated by the below-market rate have proved difficult 
to formulate and explain, and depository institutions 
have often cited uncertainty about their borrowing 
privileges as a reason for their reluctance to borrow. 
Depository institutions have been required first to seek funds in the market before seeking discount 
window credit. This requirement may make them 
reluctant to borrow because turning to the window 
after signaling their need for funds to the market 
could be seen as a sign of weakness, particularly 
during episodes of financial stress. The reluctance to 
use discount window credit stemming from these 
factors has limited the effectiveness of the discount 
window in buffering shocks to money markets. (See 
box ''Primary Credit: an Improved Safety Valve for 
Releasing Significant Market Pressures.'') 
The establishment of a lending program with an 
above-market rate would sharply reduce the need for 
the administration of the window. Reduced adminis-
tration would encourage greater uniformity in the 
administration of the discount window across Federal 
Reserve Districts. It should also mitigate institutions' 
reluctance to borrow when money markets tighten 
sharply by minimizing Reserve Bank questioning, 
by significantly increasing the comprehensibility of 
the rules regarding credit extension, and by eliminat-
ing the requirement that institutions first attempt to 
secure funds elsewhere. Furthermore, the proposed 
changes should appreciably reduce depository institu-
tions' concern that borrowing will be perceived as a 
sign of weakness, as only financially sound institu-
tions will have access to primary credit. 
The proposal to adopt a primary credit program is 
also related to the Federal Reserve's ongoing plan-
ning for contingencies. Having a means of preventing 
an undue tightening of money markets during a finan-
cial market crisis, such as that following the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001, would be useful in 
the event that depository institutions' demands for 
excess reserves rise sharply; disruptions inhibit the 
flow of funds through the banking system, particu-
larly late in the day; or the Federal Reserve's ability 
to carry out open market operations is impaired. If, as 
is intended, the primary credit facility significantly 
reduces the reluctance of depository institutions to 
use the discount window, the Federal Reserve should 
be able to cap the federal funds rate near its target 
during a crisis by reducing the primary discount rate 
to a level close to the target. 
SPECIFICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED NEW 
TYPES OF CREDIT. 
Primary Credit. 
As the replacement for adjustment credit, primary 
credit would be available only to generally sound 
depository institutions, ordinarily with little or no 
administrative burden on the borrower. It would typi-
cally be extended for very short terms (usually over-
night) but could be extended for up to a few weeks if 
the lending Reserve Bank determines that the institu-
tion is in generally sound condition and cannot obtain 
such credit in the market on reasonable terms (those 
qualifying for longer-term loans would in most cases 
be relatively small institutions that lack access to 
national money markets). 
Interest Rate. 
Under the proposal, the primary discount rate would 
be changed through the same discretionary procedure 
currently followed for setting the basic discount rate: 
The boards of directors of the Federal Reserve Banks 
would establish a primary discount rate, as well as 
other discount rates, every two weeks subject to 
review and determination by the Board of Governors, 
as required by the Federal Reserve Act. The primary 
discount rate would not be set according to a formula 
but would presumably move broadly in line with the 
target federal funds rate, much as the basic discount 
rate does currently. 
The proposal suggests that when the program 
begins, the boards of directors of the Federal Reserve 
Banks would initially establish, subject to the statuto-
rily required review and determination by the Board 
of Governors, the primary discount rate at a level 
100 basis points above the FOMC's then-prevailing 
target for the federal funds rate. That level would 
likely place the primary discount rate somewhat 
above the cost of alternative short-term funds for 
eligible depository institutions, except in circum-
stances of unusually tight money markets or funding 
needs arising very late in the day. (Such a spread 
would also be similar to the spreads employed by 
other central banks. See box ''Experience of Other 
Central Banks.'') 
A substantial spread would encourage depository 
institutions to borrow only to meet short-term, 
unforeseen needs. Too wide a spread, however, would 
mean that the federal funds rate could, at times, rise 
to undesirably high levels above the FOMC's target. 
Notably, if the primary discount rate were to fall 
close to or below the target federal funds rate, the 
Reserve Banks would again need to restrict the use 
of discount window credit, eliminating the advan-
tages of primary credit relative to adjustment credit. 
Although the proposal tentatively recommends an 
initial spread of 100 basis points, public comment 
will help inform both the Federal Reserve's choice of 
that initial spread and the subsequent establishment 
of primary discount rates. An aspect of the proposal is that the primary discount rate could be lowered in 
an emergency, thereby helping to ensure that the 
federal funds rate is capped at a level that would 
facilitate the continued functioning of financial mar-
kets during crises. 
[beginning of box:] Experience of Other Central Banks. 
The central banks of nearly all industrialized countries 
have standing lending facilities that make collateralized 
loans at an above-market rate. 
[note: 1]. The major exceptions are the Federal Reserve and the Bank of 
England. If liquidity is needed, the Bank of England instead conducts a 
late-afternoon overnight repurchase agreement (repo) operation normally 
at 100 basis points above the prevailing official repo rate. It also has the 
option of opening a late lending facility for the clearing banks after the 
markets have closed. The applicable repo rate for the late lending facility 
ranges between the official repo rate and 150 basis points above the repo 
rate, depending on market conditions. [end of note.] 
Such facilities are some-
times called ''Lombard'' facilities after Lombardkredit, 
the German term for a collateralized loan and for the 
loans made at an above-market rate by the Swiss National 
Bank and, before the formation of the European Central 
Bank (ECB), by the Bundesbank (the central bank of 
Germany). 
[note: 2]. The Lombardy region of Northern Italy was an important center of 
finance in the Middle Ages. The word ''Lombard'' came to mean banker 
or moneylender (also pawnbroker)—hence such terms as lombardkredit, 
Lombard facility, and Lombard Street, the London address that in the 
nineteenth century was the center of English banking. In his 1873 book, 
Lombard Street: A Description of the English Money Market (New York: 
E.P. Dutton, 1910), Walter Bagehot famously recommends that in 
response to a financial panic, the central bank lend freely at a penalty rate 
(chap. 7, p. 198 If.). The application of the term ''Lombard facility'' to 
that practice has to do, however, with the medieval origins of ''Lombard'' 
rather than, as is sometimes thought, with the name of Bagehot' s book or 
Lombard Street itself. [end of note.] 
In 1999, the ECB was opened with a Lom-
bard facility; in 1996, the Bank of Canada restructured its 
facilities to include an overdraft facility that acts as a 
Lombard facility; and in 2001, the Bank of Japan adopted 
a Lombard facility. Other central banks that have employed 
Lombard facilities include those in Austria, Belgium, 
France, Italy, and Sweden. These facilities typically have 
extended short-term credit with few restrictions on the 
borrowing institution's funding situation or use of the pro-
ceeds. Lombard rates have varied from 25 to 200 basis 
points above the central bank's target policy rate or related 
money market rates. The ECB has generally set the mar-
ginal lending rate (the rate on its Lombard facility) 100 
basis points above the refinancing rate (its target policy 
rate) (chart). 
European Central Bank benchmark interest rates, 1999-2002 
[graph, plotting four lines: Marginal lending rate, refinancing rate, deposit rate, and eonia (euro overnight index average). The Eonia line  follows the refinancing rate, with spikes up and down of about 1% or less.  The beginning of 1999, marginal lending rate was about 3.25%, refinancing rate about 3%, and deposit rate about 2.75%. February 1999  marginal rage moved up to about 4.5%, deposit rate to about 2%. In April 1999, marginal rate is down to about 3.5%, refinancing rate to  about 2.5%, and deposit rate to about 1.5%. In November 1999, they go up, marginal lending rate to about 4%, refinancing rate to about 3%,  deposit rate to about 2%. February 2000 they are up, marginal lending rate to about 4.25%, refinancing rate to about 3.25%, deposit rate to  about 2.25%. Through May they increase a quarter of a percent every month, marginal lending rate reaching 4.75%, refinancing rate 3.75%,  deposit rate 2.45%. They jump a half a percent in June 2000 and stay there through August. In September Marginal lending rate is about 5.5%,  refinancing rate about 4.5%, deposit rate about 3.5%. In October Marginal lending rate is about 5.75%, refinancing rate about 4.75%, deposit  rate about 3.75%. they stay there through April 2001. In May they start dropping, going back to the September 2000 rates. They stay there  through August 2001. In September they are down to Marginal lending rate about 5.25%, refinancing about 4.25%, deposit rate about 3.25.  Halfway through September 2001 there is another drop: Marginal lending rate to about 4.75%, refinancing rate about 3.75%, deposit about  2.75%. In November Marginal lending rate is about 4.25%, refinancing rate about 3.25%, deposit rate about 2.25%. They stay there  throughout 2002.] 
NOTE. The data are daily and extend through June 14, 2002. 
Discussions with staff members of these central banks 
indicate that Lombard facilities that are a part of monetary 
policy operations similar to those of the Federal Reserve 
have been very effective in setting an upper limit on market 
rates. For example, after the Bundesbank removed certain 
limits on Lombard loans and began to actively target the 
overnight interest rate, overnight market rates never rose 
above the ceiling. Similarly, since the inception of the ECB 
in 1999, the daily average interbank rate in the euro area has 
not risen above the ECB's marginal lending rate, while 
intraday data indicate that within-the-day highs of euro-area 
interbank rates have only rarely exceeded the marginal 
lending rate and by very little. The recent experience of the 
Bank of Canada indicates that its lending arrangement has 
also been an effective ceiling for rates. It is too soon to 
determine whether the Bank of Japan's Lombard facility 
will effectively cap overnight money market rates. [end of box.] 
Eligibility. 
Only depository institutions judged by the lending 
Reserve Bank to be generally sound would be eli-
gible for primary credit. At the inception of the new program, the Reserve Banks would classify each 
depository institution with a borrowing agreement 
already on file as either eligible or ineligible for 
primary credit and would notify the institution of 
its status. New applicants for Federal Reserve credit 
would be notified of their eligibility once they filed 
borrowing documents. Institutions would also be 
notified promptly of any change in their eligibility. 
The Federal Reserve would treat institutions' eligibil-
ity or ineligibility as confidential. 
The Reserve Banks would adopt uniform guide-
lines for judging institutions' degree of financial 
soundness and thus their eligibility for primary credit. 
A general principle to be reflected in the guidelines 
would be that primary credit should be viewed as an 
attractive source of funds mainly when money mar-
kets tighten significantly, pushing overnight market 
interest rates at least to the level of the primary 
discount rate. That is, all eligible institutions should 
usually face a cost of overnight funds in the market-
place somewhat below the primary discount rate. 
Because only generally sound depository institutions 
would be eligible to obtain primary credit, the estab-
lishment of eligibility guidelines could also help 
reduce the concerns of depository institutions that 
borrowing at the discount window would be viewed 
as a sign of weakness; as noted previously, such 
concerns have at times severely limited the willing-
ness of depository institutions to borrow, even when 
money markets were extremely tight. 
The guidelines for determining eligibility would be 
based primarily on supervisory ratings, though 
supplementary information, including ratings issued 
by major rating agencies, market spreads on subordi-
nated debt, information from supervisory exams in 
progress, and other news since the last exam, would 
also be considered. The Reserve Banks would ini-
tially adopt guidelines along the following lines: 
Domestically chartered depository institutions with 
CAMELS ratings of 1 or 2 and branches and agencies 
of foreign banking organizations with Strength of 
Support Assessment (SOSA) of 1 would be eligible 
for primary credit unless supplementary information 
suggested that the institution's financial condition 
had deteriorated since its last examination. 
[note: 5]. CAMELS (Capital, Assets, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, 
and Sensitivity to market risk) ratings are set on a scale of 1 through 5, 
with 5 representing the highest degree of supervisory concern. SOSA 
rankings are set on a scale of 1 through 3, with 3 representing the 
highest degree of supervisory concern. [end of note.] 
Institu-
tions rated CAMELS 3 or SOSA 2 would be eligible 
for primary credit if supplementary information sug-
gested that they were generally sound, but the fund-
ing situation of such institutions seeking credit would 
be reviewed and monitored. Institutions rated 
CAMELS 4 or SOSA 3 would not be eligible for 
primary credit except in rare circumstances, such as 
when an ongoing examination indicated a substantial 
improvement in condition. Credit extensions to ineli-
gible CAMELS 4 and SOSA 3 institutions as well as 
to CAMELS 5 institutions would be made under the 
proposed secondary credit program, described later. 
Based on the proposed guidelines and the current 
distribution of supervisory ratings, most depository 
institutions would be judged eligible for the primary 
credit program. 
These criteria are consistent with the intent of the 
guidelines for discount window lending contained in 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improve-
ment Act in that lending to troubled institutions 
would be closely monitored. The criteria are also 
consistent with the guidelines used by Federal 
Reserve Banks to determine institutions' access to 
daylight credit as set forth in the Federal Reserve's 
Payments System Risk Policy. In general, depository 
institutions that qualify for access to daylight credit 
would be eligible for primary credit, and those that 
do not would be restricted to secondary credit. 
No Requirement Regarding Exhaustion of Funds. 
The requirement in Regulation A that depository 
institutions exhaust reasonably available alternative 
sources of funds before obtaining adjustment credit 
would be dropped. The removal of this requirement 
is consistent with the overall reduction in discount 
window administration that the Federal Reserve 
would be seeking under this program. As an impor-
tant consequence, depository institutions would be 
free to sell federal funds to others while obtaining 
primary credit as long as those activities were consis-
tent with safe and sound banking practices. In addi-
tion, allowing depository institutions to resell the 
proceeds of primary credit loans would enhance the 
ability of the primary credit rate to serve as a cap on 
the federal funds rate when money markets tighten. 
For that reason, the Federal Reserve would welcome 
financially sound institutions' engagement in such 
transactions if the institutions judge that the transac-
tions would be in their financial interest. 
Collateral. 
Under the proposal, collateral policies would be 
unchanged. As required by the Federal Reserve Act, 
all borrowing would be collateralized to the satisfac-
tion of the lending Reserve Bank. Federal Reserve Banks would continue to accept a broad range of 
financial assets as collateral for discount window 
loans. 
Reserve Bank Discretion to Lend or Not Lend. 
The main purpose of the proposed primary credit 
program is to make short-term credit available as a 
backup source of liquidity to generally sound institu-
tions. Reserve Banks would retain the discretion not 
to lend in circumstances that they apprise are incon-
sistent with that purpose. 
Secondary Credit. 
Secondary credit, the proposed replacement for 
extended credit, would be designed for depository 
institutions that do not qualify for primary credit. 
Because some institutions currently eligible for 
adjustment credit would not qualify for primary 
credit, secondary credit would potentially be used 
more often than extended credit has been, particularly 
in recent years, and the program would be designed 
to recognize the somewhat broader class of borrow-
ing situations that would be covered under it. Specifi-
cally, secondary credit might be extended to meet 
temporary funding needs of an institution if, in the 
judgment of the Reserve Bank, such a credit exten-
sion would be consistent with the institution's timely 
return to reliance on private funding sources. Also, a 
Reserve Bank may extend secondary credit if, in 
cooperation with the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration and consistent with a least-cost resolution, 
the Reserve Bank determines that such credit would 
facilitate the orderly resolution of serious financial 
difficulties of the borrowing institution. The change 
in the name of the program is intended in part to 
eliminate the focus on longer-term credit extensions 
implied by the term ''extended credit.'' 
The interest rate on secondary credit would be set 
by formula at 50 basis points above the primary 
discount rate. The setting of the interest rate at a level 
above the rate on primary credit—and therefore even 
further above the target federal funds rate—reflects 
the less-sound condition of borrowers of secondary 
credit. 
Seasonal Credit. 
The proposal recommends no substantive change to 
the seasonal credit program. Seasonal credit would 
remain available to small and medium-sized institu-
tions that experience significant seasonal swings in 
their loans and deposits. The rate on seasonal credit 
would continue to be the average of the effective 
federal funds rate and the secondary market interest 
rate on large ninety-day certificates of deposit for the 
previous reserve maintenance period. Because such a 
rate would almost always be less than the primary 
discount rate, it would be necessary to remove from 
Regulation A the stipulation that the seasonal credit 
rate be at least as high as the basic discount rate. 
The seasonal credit program was originally 
designed to address the difficulties that relatively 
small banks experiencing substantial intra-yearly 
swings in funding needs faced because of a lack 
of access to the national money markets. However, 
funding opportunities for smaller depository institu-
tions have expanded considerably over the past few 
decades as a result of deposit deregulation and the 
general development of financial markets. These 
changes call into question the continued need for the 
seasonal program. The proposal seeks specific public 
comment on whether small depository institutions 
still lack reasonable access to funding markets, on the 
continued need for the seasonal lending program, and 
on the appropriate setting of the seasonal credit dis-
count rate, particularly in view of the proposed estab-
lishment of a primary credit program with an above-
market interest rate. 
NEXT STEPS. 
The Board is seeking public comments on all aspects 
of the proposal. The comment period, extending for 
ninety days from date of publication, ends August 22, 
2002. Following an analysis of the comments, the 
staff will present a revised proposal to the Board. If 
the Board votes to revise the Federal Reserve's lend-
ing programs, the changes will take place once inter-
nal procedures are modified, a process that could take 
several months, and depository institutions are made 
familiar with the new procedures. 